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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT D. PREECE,
Petitioner,

TOM HOUSE, Warden,
PETE HAUN, Chairman of the
Board of Pardons, HEATHER
COOK, Member of the Board of
Pardons, and other individual
members of the Board of Pardons
whose identities are
presently unknown,

Case No. 920605
Priority No. 13

Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this case under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a) (1992), which grants the Utah Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction to review "a judgment of the Court of
Appeals."

Preece's petition for a Writ of Certiorari was granted

on March 24, 1993.
Also presented as an issue in this case is the interpretation
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h), which gives to the Utah Court of
Appeals original appellate jurisdiction over "appeals from the
orders

on petitions

for extraordinary

writs

challenging the

decisions of the Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first

1
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degree or capital felony."

Utah Ann.

§ 78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp.

1993).
Because Preece's petition conceivably "involved" his firstdegree felony conviction, the Utah Court of Appeals may not have
had original appellate jurisdiction over this case.

Therefore,

this Court would not have jurisdiction by writ of certiorari but by
way of direct appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j)
(Supp.

1993),

which

gives

this

Court

original

appellate

jurisdiction in all cases over which the Court of Appeals has not.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did

the

Court

of

Appeals

have

original

appellate

jurisdiction over respondent's appeal?
2.

Did the trial court exceed its lawful authority by

ordering Preece released from custody?
3.

Do Utah's sentencing and release guidelines create an

expectancy of release that is protected by the due process clause?
4.

What is the appropriate remedy for the violation of an

administrative rule of the Board of Pardons?
5.

Did the Board's written explanation of April 13, 1993

provide Preece with all the relief this Court can order, therefore
mooting the case?

2
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STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues of jurisdiction and mootness were not presented to
the Utah Court of Appeals; therefore, they are before this Court
for original decision rather than review.
Concerning the other issues in this case, the applicable
standards of review are as follows.

The trial court's findings

will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.
v.

State, 830 P.2d

306, 309

Stewart

(Utah App. 1992).

Its legal

conclusions, however, are reviewed for correctness.

Termunde v.

Cook, 786 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Utah 1990) (citing Fernandez v. Cook,
783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989); see generally Stewart, 830 P.2d at 308.
Likewise, in reviewing by writ of certiorari a decision of the
Utah Court of Appeals, this Court reviews the legal conclusions for
correctness.

Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah

1992); Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P.2d 315, 318 (Utah 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
All relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules
are attached to this brief as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a review on certiorari of a decision of the Utah Court
of Appeals, which reversed the order of the district court granting
Preece's petition

for extraordinary

relief

and

ordering his

immediate release. Preece v. House, 848 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1993)
(Addendum B ) .

3
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On or about July 1, 1982, Preece was committed to the Utah
State Prison for two counts of Aggravated Robbery, a first-degree
felony.

(R. at 2-3). While incarcerated at the prison, Preece

committed manslaughter, a second-degree felony, for which he was
sentenced to a term of imprisonment for one to fifteen years to run
concurrent with his other sentences. Id.
On May 31, 1991, Preece was given a parole grant re-hearing,
conducted by Board of Pardons' member Heather Cook.

At the

conclusion of the hearing, Cook told Preece that she was going to
recommend to the other Board members that they give Preece a parole
date of May 11, 1993.

(R. 98; Addendum C, Order, Preece v. House,

Third District Court, Case No. 920902447, filed November 5, 1992).1
At the time of the hearing, Board staff had provided Cook with a
calculation, figuring out Preece7s parole date according to the
Utah Sentence and Release guidelines.

Id.

That calculated date

came to 147 months, October 11, 1994.
On June 4, 1991, the full Board met to consider Preece's
parole status. The other Board members chose not to accept Cook's
recommended parole date of May 11, 1993 and, instead, ordered a
parole date of October 11, 1994.

In May 1992, Preece filed this

1

Neither of Preece#s hearings before the Board of Pardons
were introduced into evidence in the trial court; therefore, his
use of those transcripts is inappropriate in this appeal. Because
the Board's transcripts are not part of the trial court's record,
respondents will only cite to the portions of Judge Young's record
that reflect the representations made to him regarding the Board's
hearing process.
4
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petition for extraordinary relief pursuant to Rule 65B, alleging,
among other things, that Cook was not impartial and that the
sentencing and release guidelines created an expectancy of release.
Sometime during the summer of 1992, the previous counsel for
respondents, Steven Morrisett, Assistant Attorney General, realized
that the guidelines date had been calculated incorrectly.

(R. 123;

Tr. Hearing before Hon. David S. Young, Preece v. House, Civil No.
920902447, July 20, 1992, at 3).
He asked the Board staff to recalculate the guidelines and
they found that the correct figure was 111 months (nine years,
three months) rather than 147 months (twelve years, three months).
Morrissett notified the court of this recalculation at a hearing on
July 20, 1991 and also informed the court that he had recommended
to the Board that it provide Preece with a re-hearing.

Id.

Because it appeared that the Board was going to be providing Preece
with a new hearing, the court continued the matter. At no time did
the court order the Board of Pardons to hold a hearing, provide a
written explanation, or give any additional information to Preece.
(R. 130; Tr. Hearing before Hon. David S. Young, Preece v. House,
Civil No. 920902447, July 20, 1992, at 3 ) .
On September 18, 1992, Board member Don Blanchard conducted a
special attention hearing at which Preece was present. On October
6, 1992, the Board met and re-affirmed Preece's October 11, 1994
parole date.

Preece then filed a motion to amend his petition,

adopting the allegations of the original rule 65B petition and also
5
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alleging

that

the

Board

had

failed

to provide

him

justification for exceeding the guidelines. (R. 77) .

with a

The trial

court entered an order allowing petitioner to file an amended
petition (R. 82) and respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss and
Memorandum in Support.

Respondents argued that the petition was

improperly brought pursuant to Rule 65B(c) and that it was within
the Board's sole discretion to grant a parole date outside the
sentencing and release guidelines. (R. 84-88) .
On November 2, 1992, a hearing was held before Judge David S.
Young.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Young granted the

rule 65B petition and ordered Preece's immediate release from
custody.

In his signed minute entry, Judge Young found that

petitioner [Preece] is entitled to an explanation of the
error which the Board refuses to do. Further due process
requires fair process and a petitioner is entitled to an
explanation of why the error should be ignored and the
longer term served. It is cruel and unusual punishment
to do otherewise [sic]. The petitioner has been denied
due process and has been treated to cruel and unusual
punishment when no correction or explanation is given as
to the mistake and the time to be served by the
petitioner.
(R. 90-91).
Judge Young denied respondent's motion to stay his order
releasing Preece from prison; therefore, respondents sought and
obtained an ex parte motion for stay from the Utah Court of
Appeals.

(R. 94).

The Court of Appeals held a hearing on

respondents' motion to stay and, as a consequence, summarily
reversed

the trial court

and remanded

the case

6
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for further

proceedings. The Court of Appeals agreed with respondents that the
trial court did not have the authority to terminate Preece's
sentence and that the appropriate remedy available to the district
court was to be found in rule 65B(e), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, i.e., to order the Board to expeditiously provide Preece
with a written explanation of its reasons for its parole decision,
as required by Utah Admin. Code R671-305-2

(1992).

(R. 112;

Addendum B, Preece v. House, 848 P.2d 163, 164 (Utah App. 1993)).
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the trial court incorrectly
found that the Utah Sentencing and Release Guidelines created an
enforceable liberty interest.

Id.

This Court granted a writ of

certiorari on March 24, 1993.
On April 13, 1993, the Board responded to the Court of
Appeals' opinion by sending to Preece a written rationale stating
its reasons for the parole-release decision.

(See, Addendum D,

affidavit of Patricia L. Neeley).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
All facts relevant to this case are set forth in the Statement
of the Case.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Preece

was

incarcerated

in

the

committing two first-degree felonies.
petition

for

extraordinary

relief

Utah

State

Prison

for

Although his rule 65B

does

not

challenge

those

convictions, it "involves" them because the complaint challenges
the Board's calculation of his parole-release date, based on the
7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Utah Sentencing and Release Guidelines. Under the guidelines, the
degree of offense is the primary factor in calculating the release
date.

The 1992 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h), which

places

in

this

Court

jurisdiction

over

appeals

from

orders

disposing of petitions for extraordinary writs that challenge Board
of Pardons decisions involving first-degree felonies, may not be
the wisest policy choice.

However, it has been adopted by the

legislature and this Court is obligated to interpret it according
to its plain meaning.
The only word in the amendment that requires interpretation is
the word "involves." The dictionary meaning of that term supports
the

respondent's

interpretation.

It

does

not

lead

to

the

complicated dichotomy set out by petitioner in his brief to this
Court.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction

over this case and its opinion should be vacated.

Instead, this

Court has original appellate jurisdiction over respondent's appeal
and should treat this case as a direct appeal.
Preece's case is now moot because, by giving Preece a written
explanation of its parole-release decision, the Board has already
given Preece the only relief that a court can lawfully give him -an order to comply with an order issued in response to a rule
65B(e) petition.

When the trial court ordered Preece's immediate

release, it exceeded its constitutional and statutory authority.
Under the state constitution and statute, the Board of Pardons and
Parole has the sole authority to terminate the sentence of a
8
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lawfully

convicted

and

sentenced

prisoner.

This

consistently recognized that exclusive power.

Court has

Preece has not

alleged, nor do any of the facts establish, that either his
conviction or sentence were unlawful; therefore, his restraint is
not wrongful but is, in fact, a lawful consequence of a judicial
commitment to prison.
Because Preece's restraint is lawful, extraordinary relief
pursuant to rule 65B(c) (the successor to the common-law writ of
habeas corpus) is not available and his release from custody is not
an appropriate remedy. The only relief that would be available is
found under Rule 65B(e) (the successor to the common-law writs of
mandamus and certiorari). However, the case law of certiorari and
mandamus does not allow release but only authorizes the courts to
order the Board to fulfill a duty required by law. Thus, the trial
court should have proceeded pursuant to rule 65B(e) and merely
ordered the Board to provide a written explanation for its parole
decision.
The Board did exactly this on April 13, 1993.

Thus, all the

relief that a court could order has been given Preece and the
courts can grant no further relief to him.

Under the case law

established by this Court then, Preece's case is moot and Judge
Young's order should be vacated.

9
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT
RESPONDENT'S
FIRST-DEGREE
THIS CASE AS

OF APPEALS LACKED JURISDICTION
OVER
DIRECT APPEAL BECAUSE THE CASE INVOLVED A
FELONY; THEREFORE, THIS COURT SHOULD EXAMINE
A DIRECT APPEAL.

In 1992, the legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 to
give original appellate jurisdiction to the Utah Court of Appeals
of "appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs
challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons except in cases
involving a first degree or capital felony."
3(2)(h) (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).

Utah Ann.

§ 78-2a-

Because first-degree and

capital felonies are excepted from that court's original appellate
jurisdiction, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1993) places
jurisdiction over this appeal in the Utah Supreme Court by giving
this Court jurisdiction of cases over which the Court of Appeals
does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
As the complaint shows, Preece was originally incarcerated for
two counts of aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony.
3; Addendum E).

(R. at 2-

The essence of Preece's complaint, and of Judge

Young's order, is that the Board of Pardons violated Preece's
constitutional rights by failing to comply with the Utah Sentencing
and Release Guidelines

("Guidelines") in calculating Preece's

parole release date. Specifically, Preece alleges that the parole
date of October 11, 1994 is \mconstitutional because it goes beyond
the Guidelines date.

10
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Although the degree of Preece's crimes was not the only factor
in the Board's decision to grant an October 11, 1994 release date,
Preece's case does "involve" a first-degree felony because in
calculating a date pursuant to the Guidelines, the degree of
offense is of primary importance.
taken into consideration

Before other factors are even

(such as criminal history, efforts at

rehabilitation) , a Guidelines calculation starts with the degree of
offense.

(See Addendum F, Utah Sentencing and Release Guidelines,

Form 4, Time Matrix).

Therefore, because Preece's rule 65B

petition is, in essence, a complaint about the Board's calculation
of his parole-release date, the case involves his first-degree
felony convictions as well as his second-degree felony conviction
for

manslaughter,

even

though

it

does

not

challenge

those

convictions or sentences.
Preece interprets section 78-2a-3(h) to allow the Utah Court
of Appeals to review cases challenging procedural aspects of a
Board action, while reserving for this Court challenges to the
substantive nature of the Board's decision.

Preece argues that

this dichotomy reflects the best policy for the allocation of
jurisdiction between the Utah Court of Appeals and this Court.
However, even though the 1992 amendment may make little practical
sense, this Court should not accept Preece's recommendation because
it goes far beyond the plain language of the statute. Section 782a-3(h) says nothing about substance or procedure; indeed, the only
word in that provision that may be ambiguous is "involving."
11
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{

The dictionary meaning of "involving" does not lead to the
complicated dichotomy that Preece sets out. According to Webster's
Dictionary (1988), "involve" means: (1) to include or contain as a
part or; (2) to have as an essential feature or consequence.
Webster's II, New Riverside Dictionary, at 642 (1988).

Under that

plain meaning, Preece's rule 65B petition involves a first-degree
felony.

However frustrated Preece may have been with the Board's

purported lack of explanation, his first-degree felony conviction
was an essential component of the Board's decision.

(See Addendum

F).
Because Preece's petition involved his first-degree felony
conviction, this Court has original appellate jurisdiction over the
appeal.

Therefore, the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals

should be vacated and this case should be considered as if it were
raised directly from the district court.2
POINT II
BECAUSE THE BOARD HAS COMPLIED WITH ITS RULES AND GIVEN
PREECE A WRITTEN EXPLANATION FOR ITS PAROLE DECISION, NO
FURTHER JUDICIAL RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.
THUS, JUDGE
YOUNG'S ORDER DIRECTING PREECE'S RELEASE FROM PRISON
SHOULD BE VACATED AND THIS APPEAL DISMISSED AS MOOT.
Under the mootness doctrine, a court will decline to address
the merits of the case when the 'requested judicial relief can no

2

Of course, if it is determined that this case should be
reviewed as a direct appeal, then Preece should have been in the
position of appellee rather than petitioner and the Board of
Pardons should have been allowed to file the opening brief and
reply brief.
12
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longer affect the rights of .the litigants.'

State v. Davis, 721

P.2d 894, 895 (Utah 1986) (quoting Spain v. Stewart, 639 P.2d 166,
168 (Utah 1981); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Utah
App. 1990) (appeal is moot if there is no remaining controversy
between the parties).

Preece's claim for relief is moot because

the courts are constitutionally and statutorily unable to provide
him with any additional relief over and above that which the Board
has already given through its written explanation of April 13,
1993.

The constitutionally exclusive nature of the Board's power

to grant early release will be discussed in Point III.

In Point

IV, the respondents will argue that the Utah sentencing and release
guidelines do not create an expectancy of release; therefore, the
guidelines do not provide a court separate authority to order
release.
Because Preece has already received the only relief to which
he would be entitled even if he could establish that the Board's
failure to explain its parole decision constituted a procedural due
process violation, this Court must vacate Judge Young's order of
release and dismiss this appeal.
If a case becomes moot after a timely appeal has
been filed from a lower court order . . . that order
should not be left standing to affect subsequent
proceedings or rights of the parties. 13 C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 292-94
(1974). . . . [T]he appropriate action for an appellate
court is to vacate the order of the lower court and
remand the case with instructions to dismiss.
Merhish v. H.A. Folsom & Assocs., 646 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1982).
13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT III
THE CONSTITUTION AND STATE STATUTES VEST IN THE BOARD OF
PARDONS THE EXCLUSIVE POWER TO GRANT EARLY RELEASE;
THEREFORE THE COURTS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE AN
INMATE AND JUDGE YOUNG'S ORDER WAS ILLEGAL, BEING IN
EXCESS OF HIS AUTHORITY AND A VIOLATION OF THE SEPARATION
OF POWERS CLAUSE.
This Court has recognized several times that only the Board of
Pardons can terminate an inmate's sentence prior to its statutory
expiration.

State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) ("This

Court has consistently held that the power to reduce or terminate
sentences is exclusive with the Board."); Foote v. Utah Board of
Pardons, 808 P. 2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991) (under Utah's indeterminate
sentencing system, actual number of years spent in prison left to
the "unfettered discretion of the board of pardons. . . . " ) ;

see

also Northern v. Barnes, 825 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah App.), (discretion
to give credit for time served lies solely with the Board) cert.
granted, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah'1992).
Here, the district court acted in direct opposition to these
clear and consistent statements of the law, usurping the Board's
proper authority and exceeding its jurisdiction.

In his order,

Judge Young found that the Board's action, in failing to release
Preece in slavish accordance with the guidelines or to explain its
deviation therefrom violated both due process and the cruel and
unusual punishment clause.

Though Judge Young's reasoning is

unclear on this point, it is apparently on this basis that the
court believed it could order Preece released from custody.
14
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Even

if the Board had not only violated its own rules but also the
constitution, this violation would not give the court the authority
to also violate the separation of powers clause of the Utah
constitution and infringe upon the Board's sole power to grant
parole.

In his brief, Preece attempts to support the district

court order by arguing that the courts may release an inmate as a
remedy to correct inappropriate or erroneous conduct.

Brief of

Petitioner, at 35. The federal cases that Preece cites, however,
actually support respondents' position.

In each of those cases,

the courts first remanded the case to the federal parole commission
and then stated that if the parole commission refused or failed to
comply, then the district court could grant the writ and order
release.

Preece's case is unlike those, however, because Judge

Young never ordered the Board to take any action; therefore, the
Board never failed to comply with a court order.
The court's decision in Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933,
(3rd Cir. 1988), which Preece cites in support of his claim, also
contradicts Preece's reasoning and directly supports respondents'
argument.

In Marshall, the district court issued an order very

similar to Judge Young's.
described it:

As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals

"In light of the protracted history of the case and

the court's impression that the [Parole] Commission would continue
to evade the court's mandate, the [district] court declined to
remand [to the Parole Commission] for further explanation." Id. at

15
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I

93 9.

Instead the district court granted the writ and ordered

immediate release.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the order granting
the writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, the court stated that the
district court's remedy, i.e. release, was excessive and that an
appropriate remedy "would be a remand to the Parole Commission for
an explanation of its decision." Id. at 950. This set of facts is
similar to Preece. Even though in this case, the trial court never
ordered the Board to provide an explanation, the tenor of the
court's comments at the November 2, 1992 hearing erroneously
present the Board as having wilfully disobeyed a court mandate.3
Like the district court's order in Marshall, Judge Young's
order granting the writ of habeas corpus also was excessive.

Not

only does the order exceed the trial court's authority, but it does
not make logical sense because the punishment, so to speak, does

3

In fact, the trial court never entered an order instructing
the Board to take any action whatsoever. The Board's rehearing was
held upon the recommendation of its attorney and was not initiated
by the court. The July 20, 1992 hearing before the trial court
shows that the court was not ordering the Board to take an action
but was acting in response t.o the Board. As Judge Young stated:
"In order to determine whether to grant the writ or dismiss the
case I think we ought to let the Board of Pardons decide what they
want to do in terms of taking their own action first." (R. 130).
Thus, the trial court's later decision to grant the writ was
not the result of the Board's noncompliance with a court order
because no such order was ever made. It appears instead, that the
order resulted from the trial court's disagreement with the Board's
discretionary decision.
Because the Board did not, in fact,
disobey a court order, the cases Preece cites are not analogous to
his situation.
16
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not fit the crime. At the November 2, 1992 hearing, the only issue
before the court was the Board's purported failure to explain its
decision.

That failure did not magically erase Preece's three

convictions and satisfy his debt to society.

At most, it imposed

on obligation on the Board to provide the missing explanation.4
However, rather than order the Board to fully comply with its
administrative rules, the trial court chose to stand in the shoes
of the Board and release Preece on its own initiative. This action
not only contradicted numerous cases from this Court but also
violated state statute and the state constitution.
In Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3), the legislature has determined
that decisions of the Board of Pardons are final and are not
subject to judicial review.

Although this Court in Foote v. Utah

Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991), interpreted that
provision to allow review by extraordinary writ, that review has
been limited to reviewing and remedying procedural due process
violations. Foote, 808 P.2d at 735 (number of years actually spent
in prison left to "unfettered discretion11 of the Board of Pardons) ;
see also Northern, 825 P. 2d at 698

(Utah App.)

(substantive

decisions of the Board of Pardons are unreviewable). cert, granted,
843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).

4

Ironically, by essentially nullifying the Board's order
granting early release to Preece on October 10, 1994, the trial
court actually brought Preece's full five-to-life sentence back
into full force and effect. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-4 (1992).
17
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Even though Preece's claim may allege a procedural due process
violation

for the Board's

failure to follow

its own ruling

requiring an explanation of its parole decision, subsection 77-275(3) does not allow a substantive remedy, such as release, for that
violation.

Were the courts able to alter or usurp the Board's

essential substantive decision-making function on the pretext of a
procedural due process violation, then not only subsection 77-275(3) but also two provisions of the state constitution, relating to
the separation of powers and the Board of Pardons, would be
rendered meaningless. The appropriate remedy for a procedural due
process violation is not a -substantive remedy but a procedural
remedy --an order to the Board to comply with correct procedure.
The

unreviewability

of

the

Board's

substantive

parole

decisions is not just a creature of the legislature. It is instead
mandated by the interplay of two separate provisions of the Utah
Constitution. Article VII, section 12 specifically creates a Board
of Pardons and Parole to make these substantive decisions about
parole. Article V explicitly divides the powers of the government
into

three

distinct

departments

and prohibits

one

of

those

departments from exercising functions appertaining to another.
The trial court's holding in the instant case is in direct
contradiction to the constitutional delegation of authority, prior
Utah decisions, and the historical purposes and functions of the
Board of Pardons. The people, of this state have given the Board of
Pardons, not the courts, the constitutional authority to determine
18
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whether an inmate has been rehabilitated

sufficiently

to be

entitled to parole. The separation of powers clause prohibits any
person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to
one branch from exercising a function appertaining to another. The
trial courts are a part of the judicial branch, created in Article
VIII of the constitution; the Board of Pardons is a part of the
executive branch, created in Article VII. When it released Preece
from custody, the trial court usurped the executive authority of
the Board of Pardons and violated the constitution. See Kimball v.
Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 1 (1899) (delegation of power
to one branch implies inhibition against its exercise by another
branch).
POINT IV
THE UTAH SENTENCING AND RELEASE GUIDELINES DO NOT REQUIRE
THE BOARD EITHER TO RELEASE PREECE AT A DATE CALCULATED
PURSUANT TO THE GUIDELINES OR WITH A WRITTEN EXPLANATION
SETTING FORTH ITS REASONS FOR GOING OVER THE GUIDELINES.
Preece relies on federal case precedent for the proposition
that Utah's Sentencing and Release Guidelines create a liberty
interest protected by the due process clause.
misplaced.

This reliance is

Those federal cases simply are not on point because

they interpret a federal statute that required the United States
Parole Commission to either follow them or state, in writing, why
they should not apply. 18 U.S.C. § 4206 (repealed 1987).5 Whereas
5

Although the laws relating to the United States Parole
Commission were technically repealed in 1987, they continue in
effect for any prisoners sentenced before November 1, 1987. Pulver
19
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the

Utah

Court

of Appeals

previously

has

held

that Utah's

guidelines do not create a liberty interest, Hall v. Board of
Pardons, 806 P.2d 217, 218 (Utah App. 1991), the federal sentencing
and release guidelines did create a liberty interest.

Solomon v.

Elsea, 676 F.2d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1982); Evans v. Dillahunty, 662
F.2d 522 (8th Cir. 1981).
In Hall, the Utah Court of Appeals directly addressed the
question of whether the sentencing and release guidelines created
a protected liberty interest.

After examining the nature of the

guidelines, that court determined that the guidelines did not, in
fact, create a liberty interest. The Hall decision was binding on
Judge Young, but he ignored it.
are,

The guidelines are not law, but

instead, a cooperative venture between criminal justice

agencies.

As directed by Utah Code Ann. § 63-25-4 (1990), the

Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice adopted the guidelines
in 1985.

Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines, Appendix D Utah

Court Rules Ann. 1128 (1993) . The guidelines have not been adopted
by the Legislature as law, nor has the Utah Supreme Court made them
mandatory for the courts.
Indeed, the guidelines themselves state that they are not
"intended to set policy in concrete" and that "[n]o additional
legislation is being proposed to coerce agencies to conform." id.
at 1130. This is far different from the statutory language in 18

v. Brennan, 912 F.2d 894, 895 n.l (7th Cir. 1987).
20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

U.S.C. § 4206 which required the United States Parole Commission to
follow the guidelines absent good cause.

The Court of Appeals in

Hall correctly concluded that the guidelines did not create a
liberty interest.

The Michigan sentencing guidelines, which are

similarly of an advisory nature, also have been construed to not
create a liberty interest. Thomas v. Foltz, 654 F. Supp. 105, 107
(E.D. Mich. 1987).
The Michigan Supreme

Court

issued

the guidelines

in an

administrative order and invited, but did not require, their use.
Thomas, 654 F. Supp. at 107.

Even though the Michigan Supreme

Court later made consideration of the guidelines mandatory upon
sentencing judges, they were still free to go above the guidelines
if they specified the reason:

"Adherence to the guidelines is

wholly discretionary; the Supreme Court asks that sentencing judges
explain

their

deviations

only

to

improve

the

guidelines

themselves." Id. Further, the Thomas court held that a sentencing
judge was not required to explain to the criminal defendant why it
was deviating from the guidelines.

Id.

Similarly, at Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1993), Utah
courts are required to consider the sentencing guidelines but are
not required to abide by them or explain their reasons for going
above them.

No statute imposes an obligation upon the Board of

Pardons to even consider the guidelines.

Taken to its logical

extreme, Preece's argument that these advisory guidelines be given
the status of constitutional commandments undercuts efforts to
21
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establish uniformity and consistency
system.

in the criminal justice

As the United States Supreme Court stated in Hewitt v.

Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471 (1982):
The creation of procedural guidelines to channel the
decision-making of prison officials is, in the view of
many experts in the field, a salutary development. It
would be ironic to hold that when a State embarks on such
desirable experimentation it thereby opens the door to
scrutiny . . . while States that choose not to adopt such
procedural provisions entirely avoid the strictures of
the Due Process Clause.
The Court of Appeals was correct when it stated in Hall that
the guidelines are not "mandatory standards which must be followed
but merely guidelines used to clarify the Board's exercise of
discretion without altering any of the existing considerations for
parole release."

Hall, 806 P.,2d at 218.

Preece simply did not

have any right to expect that the guidelines would be applied or
that he would be given an explanation particularly stating why the
guidelines date was not chosen.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respondents respectfully request
the following relief.

If this Court finds that the April 13, 1993

written explanation from the Board mooted this appeal, then Judge
Young's order must be vacated and this appeal dismissed.

In the

alternative, this Court must reverse Judge Young's order granting
the writ and releasing Preece from prison.
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ARTICLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
Section 1. [Three departments of government.]
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions
appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company
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Sec. 12. [Board of Pardons and Parole - Appointment - Powers and procedures - Governor's
powers and duties - Legislature's powers.]
(1) There is created a Board of Pardons and Parole. The Governor shall appoint the
members of the board with the consent of the Senate. The terms of office shall be as provided
by statute.
(2) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole, by majority vote and upon other conditions as
provided by statute, may grant parole, remit fines, forfeitures and restitution orders, commute
punishments, and grant pardons after convictions, in all cases except treason and impeachments,
subject to regulations as provided by statute.
(b) A fine, forfeiture, or restitution order may not be remitted and a commutation, parole,
or pardon may not be granted except after a full hearing before the board, in open session, and
after previous notice of the time and place of the hearing has been given.
(c) The proceedings and decisions of the board, the reasons therefor in each case, and the
dissent of any member who may disagree shall be recorded and filed as provided by statute with
all papers used upon the hearing.
(3) (a) The Governor may grant respites or reprieves in all cases of convictions for offenses
against the state except treason or conviction on impeachment. These respites or reprieves may
not extend beyond the next session of the board. At that session, the board shall continue or
determine the respite or reprieve, commute the punishment, or pardon the offense as provided
in this section.
(b) In case of conviction for treason, the Governor may suspend execution of the sentence
until the case is reported to the Legislature at its next annual general session, when the
Legislature shall pardon or commute the sentence, or direct its execution. If the Legislature takes
no action on the case before adjournment of that session, the sentence shall be executed.
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company
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PAROLE

18USCS§4206

§4206. Parole determination criteria [Repealed, but see other
provisions note for continuation]
(a) If an eligible prisoner has substantially observed the rules of the
institution or institutions to which he has been confined, and if the
Commission, upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the prisoner, determines:
(1) that release would not depreciate the seriousness of his offense or
promote disrespect for the law; and
(2) that release would not jeopardize the public welfare; subject to the
provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section, and pursuant to
guidelines promulgated by the Commission pursuant to section
4203(aXl)t such prisoner shall be released
(b) The Commission shall furnish the eligible prisoner with a written notice
of its determination not later than twenty-one days, excluding holidays,
after the date of the parole determination proceeding. If parole is denied
such notice shall state with particularity the reasons for such denial
(c) The Commission may grant or deny release on parole notwithstanding
the guidelines referred to in subsection (a) of this section if it determines
there is good cause for so doing: Provided, That the prisoner is furnished
written notice stating with particularity the reasons for its determination,
including a summary of the information relied upon.
(d) Any prisoner, serving a sentence of five years or longer, who is not
earlier released under this section or any other applicable provision of law,
shall be released on parole after having served two-thirds of each consecutive term or terms, or after serving thirty years of each consecutive term or
terms of more than forty-five years including any life term, whichever is
earlien Provided, however, That the Commission shall not release such
prisoner if it determines that he has seriously or frequently violated
institution rules and regulations or that there is a reasonable probability
that he will commit any Federal, State, or local crime.
(Added March 15, 1976, P. L. 94-233, § 2, 90 Stat 223.)
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63-25-4. Duties of commission.
The state commission on criminal and juvenile justice administration shall:
(1) promote the coordination of all criminal and juvenile justice agencies;
(2) provide analysis and recommendations on all criminal and juvenile justice legislation,
state budget, and facility requests, including program and fiscal impact on all components of the
criminal and juvenile justice system;
(3) provide analysis, accountability, recommendations, and supervision for federal criminal
justice grant monies;
(4) provide public information on the criminal and juvenile justice system and give technical
assistance to agencies or local units of government on methods to promote public awareness;
(5) promote research and program evaluation as an integral part of the criminal and juvenile
justice system;
(6) provide a comprehensive criminal justice plan annually, that includes a strategic plan
for the efficient management of information resources;
(7) develop, monitor, and evaluate sentencing and release guidelines for adults and
juveniles;
(8) forecast future demands on the criminal justice system, including specific projections
for secure bed space; and
(9) promote the development of criminal and juvenile justice information systems that are
consistent with common standards for data storage and are capable of appropriately sharing
information with other criminal justice information systems by:
(a) developing and maintaining common data standards for use by all state criminal justice
agencies;
(b) annually performing audits of criminal history record information maintained by state
criminal justice agencies to assess their accuracy, completeness, and adherence to standards;
(c) defining and developing state and local programs and projects associated with the
improvement of information management for law enforcement and the administration of justice;
and
(d) establishing general policies concerning criminal justice information systems and
making rules as necessary to carry out the duties under this subsection and Subsection (6).
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company
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76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed - Civil penalties - Restitution - Hearing
- Definitions - Resentencing - Aggravation or mitigation of crimes with mandatory sentences.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or
without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and medical
expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim,
including insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition
or transportation.
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person adjudged
guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty,
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the
defendant make restitution up to double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or
victims of the offense of which the defendant has been convicted, or to the victim of any other
criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court.
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(

(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria
in Subsection (c).
(b) (i) When a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30,
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in the
county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity
for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria
in Subsection (c).
(c) In determining whether or not to order restitution, or restitution that is complete, partial,
or nominal under this subsection, the court shall take into account:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will
impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other
conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the method
of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) (i) When the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this
subsection, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) The court shall send a copy of its order of restitution to the Division of Finance.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the
court shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the
defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation
expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear warrant
issued for an infraction;
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (a)(i) shall be
calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported;
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (i) applies to each defendant transported
regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of three stated
minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the term of middle severity
unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a statement identifying
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts. If the statement is in
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writing, it shall be filed with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior
to the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or
lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, the probation officer's report, other
reports, including reports received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or
mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced
at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for imposing the
upper or lower term.
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing guidelines regarding
aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice.
(7) (a) (i) If a defendant subject to Subsection (6) has been sentenced and committed to the
Utah State Prison, the court may, within 120 days of the date of commitment on its own motion,
or at any time upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons, recall the sentence and
commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if he had
not previously been sentenced, so long as the new sentence is no greater than the initial sentence
nor less than the mandatory time prescribed by statute.
(ii) The resentencing provided for in this section shall take into consideration the
sentencing guidelines established under this section by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile
Justice to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.
(iii) Credit shall be given for time served.
(b) (i) The court shall state the reasons for its sentence choice on the record at the time of
sentencing.
(ii) The court shall also inform the defendant as part of the sentence that if the defendant
is released from prison he may be on parole for a period of ten years.
(c) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, rape of a child,
object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the defendant causes
substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is set forth in the information or
indictment and admitted by the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant
shall be sentenced to the aggravated mandatory term in state prison. This subsection takes
precedence over any conflicting provision of law.
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company
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77-18-4. Sentence - Term - Construction.
Whenever a person is convicted of a crime and the judgment provides for a commitment to
the state prison, the court shall not fix a definite term of imprisonment unless otherwise provided
by law. The sentence and judgment of imprisonment shall be for an indeterminate term of not
less than the minimum and not to exceed the maximum term provided by law for the particular
crime. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, every sentence, regardless of its form
or terms, which purports to be for a shorter or different period of time, shall be construed to
be a sentence for the term between the minimum and maximum periods of time provided by law
and shall continue until the maximum period has been reached unless sooner terminated or
commuted by authority of the Board of Pardons.

(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company
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77-27-5. Board of Pardons authority.
(1) (a) The Board of Pardons shall determine by majority decision when and under what
conditions, subject to this chapter and other laws of the state, persons committed to serve
sentences in class A misdemeanor cases at penal or correctional facilities which are under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, and all felony cases except treason or
impeachment or as otherwise limited by law, may be released upon parole, pardoned, restitution
ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures, or restitution remitted, or their sentences commuted or
terminated.
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct hearings. The chairperson shall
appoint members to the panels in any combination and in accordance with rules promulgated by
the board, except in hearings involving commutation and pardons. The chairperson may
participate on any panel and when doing so is chairperson of the panel. The chairperson of the
board may designate the chairperson for any other panel.
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or restitution remitted, no parole,
pardon, or commutation granted or sentence terminated, except after a full hearing before the
board or the board's appointed examiner in open session. Any action taken under this subsection
other than by a majority of the board shall be affirmed by a majority of the board.
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a full hearing before the board.
(2) (a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, rehearings, and parole revocation
hearings, timely prior notice of the time and place of the hearing shall be given to the defendant,
the county or district attorney's office responsible for prosecution of the case, the sentencing
court, law enforcement officials responsible for the defendant's arrest and conviction, and
whenever possible, the victim or the victim's family.
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family shall include information provided
in Section 77-27-9.5, and any related rules made by the board under that section. This
information shall be provided in terms that are reasonable for the lay person to understand.
(3) Decisions of the Board of Pardons in cases involving paroles, pardons, commutations
or terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are final and are not
subject to judicial review. Nothing in this section prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a
civil judgment.
(4) This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or limitation of the governor's power
to grant respite or reprieves in all cases of convictions for offenses against the state, except
treason or conviction on impeachment. However, respites or reprieves may not extend beyond
the next session of the Board of Pardons and the board, at that session, shall continue or
terminate the respite or reprieve, or it may commute the punishment, or pardon the offense as
provided. In the case of conviction for treason, the governor may suspend execution of the
sentence until the case is reported to the Legislature at its next session. The Legislature shall
then either pardon or commute the sentence, or direct its execution.
(5) In determining when, where, and under what conditions offenders serving sentences may
be paroled, pardoned, have restitution ordered, or have their fines or forfeitures remitted, or
their sentences commuted or terminated, the Board of Pardons shall consider whether the persons
have made or are prepared to make restitution as ascertained in accordance with the standards
and procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a condition of any parole, pardon, remission of fines or
forfeitures, or commutation or termination of sentence.
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78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified
by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and authority
to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees
or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory
appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment
by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(v) the state engineer;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings
of agencies under Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United States
or this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah
Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or
capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals
does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which
the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record
involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers; and
(e) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of
certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review
those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its
review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all
writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments., orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory
appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the
agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands,
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local
agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims department of a
circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court: of record in criminal cases, except those involving
a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of
a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are
•$ incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions
of the Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited
to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and
paternity;
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the
court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in
its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.

(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company
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Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief.
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available,
a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on any of the grounds set forth in
paragraph (b) (involving wrongful imprisonment), paragraph (c) (involving other types of
wrongful restraint on personal liberty), paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of public or
corporate authority) or paragraph (e) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority and the
failure to exercise such authority). There shall be no special form of writ. The procedures in this
rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the extent that this rule
does not provide special procedures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be
governed by the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules.
(b) Wrongful imprisonment.
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to imprisonment in a state prison, other
correctional facility or county jail who asserts that the commitment resulted from a substantial
denial of rights may petition the court for relief under this paragraph. This paragraph (b) shall
govern proceedings based on claims relating to original commitments and commitments for
violation of probation or parole. This paragraph (b) shall not govern proceedings based on claims
relating to the terms or conditions of confinement.
(2) Commencement. Except for challenges to parole violation proceedings, the proceeding
shall be commenced by filing a petition, together with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the
district court in the county in which the commitment leading to confinement was issued. The
court may order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or
witnesses. Petitions challenging parole violation proceedings shall be commenced by filing a
petition together with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the district court in the county in which
the petitioner is located.
(3) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in
relation to the legality of the commitment. Additional claims relating to the legality of the
commitment may not be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The
petition shall state:
(A) the place where the petitioner is restrained;
(B) the name of the court by which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the
dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered, together with the court's case number
for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner;
(C) in plain and concise terms, alt of the facts on the basis of which the petitioner claims
a substantial violation of rights as the result of the commitment;
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(D) whether or not the judgment of conviction or the commitment for violation of
probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and caption or title of
the appellate proceeding and the results of the review;
(E) whether the legality of the commitment has already been adjudicated in any prior
post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and if so the reasons for the denial of relief in the
prior proceeding.
(4) Attachments to the petition. The petitioner shall attach to the petition affidavits, copies
of records or other evidence available to the petitioner in support of the allegations. The
petitioner shall also attach to the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any
prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the commitment,
and a copy of all orders and memoranda of the court. If copies of pertinent pleadings, orders,
and memoranda are not attached, the petition shall state why they are not attached.
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or
discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two
copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly
deliver it to the assigned judge of the court in which it is filed. Except for challenges to parole
violation proceedings, the presiding judge shall if possible assign the proceeding to the judge
who issued the commitment.
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is apparent to the court
that the issues presented in the petition have already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or
if for any other reason any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its face. The
order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the
entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or
conclusions of law.
(8) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part
of the petition is not frivolous on its face, the court shall designate the portions of the petition
that are not frivolous and direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any
memorandum by mail upon the attorney general and the county attorney.
(9) Responsive pleading. Within twenty days (plus time allowed under these rules for
service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the attorney general and county
attorney, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the attorney general or
county attorney shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that have not
been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon the petitioner in accordance
with Rule 5(b). Within twenty days (plus time allowed for service by mail) after service of any
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motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the
motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court.
(10) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for
a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. Upon motion for good cause, the court may grant
leave to either party to take discovery or to extend the date for the hearing. Prior to the hearing,
the court may order either the petitioner or the state or county to obtain any relevant transcript
or court records. The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not
be set so as to delay unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. The petitioner shall
be present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present
in court during the proceeding.
(11) Orders. If the court rules in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate order
with respect to the validity of the challenged commitment and with respect to rearraignment,
retrial, resentencing, custody, bail or discharge. The court shall enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law, as appropriate, following any evidentiary hearing or any hearing on a
dispositive motion. Upon application of the attorney general or the county attorney, or upon its
own motion, the court may stay release of the petitioner pending appeal of its order.
(12) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d),
to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the
proceeding, the petitioner may proceed upon an affidavit of impecuniosity, in which event the
court may direct that the costs be paid by the county in which the complainant was originally
charged.
(13) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and
reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes
governing appeals to those courts.
(c) Other wrongful restraints on personal liberty.
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by paragraph (b) of this rule, this paragraph (c)
shall govern all petitions claiming that a person has been wrongfully restrained of personal
liberty, and the court may grant relief appropriate under this paragraph.
(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk
of the court in the district in which the petitioner is restrained or the respondent resides or in
which the alleged restraint is occurring.
(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall contain a short, plain
statement of the facts on the basis of which the petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the
respondent and the place where the person is restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of
the restraint, if known by the petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of the restraint has
already been, adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, the reasons for the denial of relief in
3
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the prior proceeding. The petitioner shall attach to the petition any legal process available to the
petitioner that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a copy of the
pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the
restraint.
(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or
discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two
copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is apparent to the court
that the legality of the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any
other reason any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith
issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its face and the reasons
for this conclusion. The order need not state findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order
shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry
of the order of dismissal.
{

(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being frivolous on its face, the
court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any
memorandum upon the respondent by mail. At the same time, the court may issue an order
directing the respondent to answer or otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a time within
which the respondent must comply. If the circumstances require, the court may also issue an
order directing the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on the legality of the
restraint. An answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has restrained the
person alleged to have been restrained, whether the person so restrained has been transferred to
any other person, and if so, the identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason
or authority for the transfer. Nothing in paragraph (c) shall be construed to prohibit the court
from ruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive motion.
(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained will be removed
from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury before compliance with the hearing
order can be enforced, the court shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the
respondent before the court to be dealt with according to law. Pending a determination of the
petition, the court may place the person alleged to have been restrained in the custody of such
other persons as may be appropriate.
(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the respondent cannot be found, or if it
appears that a person other than the respondent has custody of the person alleged to be
restrained, the hearing order and any other process issued by the court may be served on the
person having custody in the manner and with the same effect as if that person had been named
as respondent in the action.
(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone having custody of the person alleged to
be restrained avoids service of the hearing order or attempts wrongfully to remove the person
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from the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person. The
sheriff shall forthwith bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt with according to
law.
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the court orders a hearing, the court
shall hear the matter in a summary fashion and shall render judgment accordingly. The
respondent or other person having custody shall appear with the person alleged to be restrained
or shall state the reasons for failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct the respondent
to bring before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the petitioner waives the right to be
present at the hearing, the court shall modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order
shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in the order or the petition,
if enough is stated to impart the meaning and intent of the proceeding to the respondent.
(d) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority.
(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorney general may, and when directed to
do so by the governor shall, petition the court for relief on the grounds enumerated in this
paragraph (d). Any person who is not required to be represented by the attorney general and
who is aggrieved or threatened by one of the acts enumerated in subparagraph (2) of this
paragraph (d) may petition the court under this paragraph (d) if (A) the person claims to be
entitled to an office unlawfully held by another or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a
petition under this paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed by a
person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be brought in the name of the
petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay
any judgment for costs and damages that may be recovered against the petitioner in the
proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided for in Rule 73.
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate, relief may be granted: (A) where a person usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, whether civil or military, a
franchise, or an office in a corporation created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where
a public officer does or permits any act that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where
persons act as a corporation in the state of Utah without being legally incorporated; (D) where
any corporation has violated the laws of the state of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or
renewal of corporations; or (E) where any corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate
rights, privileges or franchises.
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may require that notice
be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order
requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may also grant
temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A.
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(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty.
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are threatened by any of the
acts enumerated in this paragraph (e) may petition the court for relief.
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior court,
administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or
abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person
has failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; or (C) where
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the petitioner the use
or enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is entitled.
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may require that notice
be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order
requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the
inferior court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named as respondent
to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the proceedings. The court may also grant
temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A.
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, the court's
review shall not extend further than to determine whether the respondent has regularly pursued
its authority.
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company
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R671-305-1. Notification of Board's Decision.
The offender will be notified verbally at the conclusion of the hearing of the action taken
or that the Board has taken the matter under advisement.
The decision of the Board shall be reduced to writing, including the rationale for the
decision. Copies of the written decision are given to the offender, the institution and Field
Operations. The Board shall publish written results of Board meetings, in minute form. Copies
of minutes shall be kept on permanent file in the Board office.

(c) 1990, 1991, 1993 By The Michie Company
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PER CURIAM:
This case is before the court on respondents' motion for a
stay pending appeal of an order granting a petition for writ of
habeas corpus and ordering the release of petitioner Robert D.
Preece forthwith. In addition to opposing the stay, petitioner
has moved this court for summary disposition of the appeal. In
the interest of expediting a decision in this case, we deem it
appropriate to address the merits of the appeal at this time.
See Rule 2, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. We reverse the
order of the district court, in part, andjremand-for further
proceedings consistent with this decision.
The complaint filed by petitioner in the district court
challenged the determination of his parole date by the Board of
Pardons. The order of the trial court recites that the Board
applied an internal guideline of 147 months in determining
petitioner's release date of October 10, 1994. The Board
subsequently learned that the actual guideline for the offenses
was 111 months. Under that guideline, petitioner would have been
entitled to release on parole on October 10, 1991. The district
court continued proceedings on the petition to allow the Board
"to correct the error or explain their reasons for deviating from
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the guidelines." The Board held a special attention hearing and
reaffirmed the release date at 147 months for October 10, 1994,
without providing any written explanation for its decision, as
required by its own internal rules. See R671-305-2, Utah
Administrative Code (1992).
Based upon the preceding facts, the trial court granted the
petition and ordered petitioner's release "forthwith," stating:
This court finds that under the circumstance
of the error made as to the guidelines
discussed with Petitioner that the Petitioner
is entitled to an explanation of the error
which the Board refuses to do. Further, due
process requires fair process and a
Petitioner is entitled to an explanation of
why the error should be ignored and the
longer term served. It is cruel and unusual
punishment to do otherwise. The Petitioner
has been denied due process and is being
treated to cruel and unusual punishment when
no correction or explanation is given as to
the mistake and as to the time to be served
by the Petitioner.
Respondents contend that the trial court exceeded its
authority in ordering the release of the petitioner as a remedy
for the due process violation found by the court, and that the
court should have proceeded in accordance with Rule 65B(e), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 65B(e)(2)(B) provides that relief
may be granted "where an inferior court, administrative agency,
corporation or person has failed to perform an act required by
law as a duty of office, trust or station." Respondents,
accordingly, contend that the petition is not a proper petition
for "wrongful imprisonment" under Rule 65B(b) because it is not a
challenge to the validity of the original commitment, and because
petitioner is serving a valid sentence that has not been set
aside on by any court on appeal or otherwise.
Although we agree that the petitioner was entitled to a
written explanation of the parole determination following the
special attention hearing, we hold that the district court
exceeded its authority in ordering the unconditional release of
petitioner based upon the failure of the Board to comply with the
prior orders of the court and its own procedural rules. Under
our indeterminate sentencing system, the authority to determine
parole dates is vested in the Board of Pardons. See Foote v.
Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991). While parole
decisions are subject to habeas corpus review under Foote, this
court has previously held that the scope of review is limited to
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a review of procedural due process and does not extend authority
for judicial review of the "reasonableness of the parole
decision", which is not subject to judicial review under Utah
Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (Supp. 1992). Northern v. Barnes. 825 P.2d
696, 699 (Utah App. 1992). We conclude that the appropriate
remedy for the procedural due process violation found by the
district court in this case is to require the Board expeditiously
to provide the district court and petitioner with a written
explanation of its reasons for the parole decision. See also
R671-305-2, Utah Administrative Code (1992). To the extent that
the district court's ruling is based upon a determination that
the Board's guidelines are mandatory, that conclusion is an
incorrect statement of the law under State v. Hall. 806 P.2d 217,
218 (Utah App. 1991).
The order of the district court is reversed insofar as it
provides for unconditional release of petitioner from the custody
of the Department of Corrections. The case is remanded to the
district court with instructions to treat the petition under Rule
65B(e).

w

fegnal W. Garff, Judge

I, the undersigned, Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals
do hereby oerttfy that the foregoing is a full, true anc
correct copy of an original document on file in the Utaf
Court of Appeals. In testimony whereof, I have set my
hand and affixed the seal of the Cour

Court
ity Clerk
Date
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
PREECE, ROBERT D
PLAINTIFF
VS
HOUSE, TOM
UTAH DEPT OF CORRECT DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:

CASE NUMBER 920902447 HC
DATE 11/02/92
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG
COURT REPORTER EILEEN AMBORSE
COURT CLERK CLP

HABEAS CORPUS WRIT

P. ATTY. PREECE, ROBERT D PRO SE
D. ATTY. BEADLES, JAMES;MILLER, LORENZO
SWORN AND EXAMINED
OTHERS: TORGESON, KIRK

PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS COMES
BEFORE THE COURT FOR HEARING, WITH APPEARANCES AS SHOWN ABOVE.
BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH THE PLAINTIFF PRO SE AND DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL, THE COURT ORDERS PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IS DENIED. THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS PLAINTIFF'S
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS GRANTED AS READ INTO THE RECORD
AND i; PAINTJET IS TO BE RELEASED FROM THE UTAH STATE PRISON
FORTHWITH.
THE WRIT IS GRANTED BASED, IN PART, ON STIPULATED FACTS AS
FOLLOWS: (1) PETITIONER WAS HEARD BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDON
BY APPEARING BEFORE HEATHER COOKE IN MAY OF 1991. AT THAT TIME,
MS. COOKE RECOMMENDED THAT MR. PREECE BE RELEASED IN MAY OF
1993. SHE DISCUSSED WITH MR. PREECE THAT THE TIME GUIDELINES
RECOMMENDED 12 1/2 YEARS. THE RECOMMENDATION OF MS. COOKE WAS
THEN CONSIDERED BY THE BOARD AS A GROUP AND THEY DETERMINED NOT
TO FOLLOW MS. COOKE'S RECOMMENDATION BUT ORDERED RELEASE OCTOBER
10, 1994. THAT DATE WAS EXACTLY 12 1/2 YEARS OR CONSISTENT WITH
THEIR GUIDELINES. (2) THEREAFTER, IT WAS LEARNED THAT THE
BOARD'S ACTUAL GUIDELINE AT THAT TIME WAS 9 1/2 YEARS RATHER
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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THAN 12 1/2 AS THEY HAD THOUGHT. UNDER THAT GUIDELINE THE
PETITIONER WOULD HAVE BEEN ENTITLED TO RELEASE OCTOBER 10, 1991.
(3) REALIZING THAT THE BOARD OF PARDONS HAD NOT HAD THE
OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECT THE ERROR OR EXPLAIN THEIR REASONS FOR
DEVIATING FROM THE GUIDELINES, THE COURT CONTINUED THE PETITION
FOR A WRIT SEVERAL TIMES. THE BOARD HELD A "SPECIAL ATTENTION"
HEARING AND WITHOUT EXPLANATION OF THE ERROR AND EXPLANATION
OF THE REASON TO DEVIATE FROM THEIR GUIDELINES THEY AFFIRMED THE
RELEASE DATE AT 12 1/2 YEARS.
THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO AN
EXPLANATION OF THE ERROR WHICH THE BOARD REFUSES TO DO. FURTHER
DUE PROCESS REQUIRES FAIR PROCESS AND A PETITIONER IS ENTITLED
TO AN EXPLANATION OF WHY THE ERROR SHOULD BE IGNORED AND THE
LONGER TERM SERVED. IT IS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT TO DO
OTHEREWISE. THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN DENIED DUE PROCESS AND HAS
BEEN TREATED TO CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT WHEN NO CORRECTION
OR EXPLANATION IS GIVEN AS TO
SERVED BY THE PETITIONER.
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT
APPEAL. THE MOTION IS DENIED.
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PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
"bet
Utah Attorney General
JAMES H. BEADLES (5250)
Special Assistant Attorney General
6100 South 300 East, Suite 204
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 265-5638
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT D. PREECE,
Petitioner,

s
:
:

ORDER

V.

!:

Case No. 920902447

TOM HOUSE, et al.,

i:

Hon. David Young

Respondents.

i

Petitioner's complaint for extraordinary relief came before
this court on November 2, 1992 for hearing. Petitioner represented
himself; the Respondents were represented by James H. Beadles,
Special Assistant Attorney General, and Lorenzo Miller, Assistant
Attorney General. Based on discussion with the Petitioner pro se,
counsel for Respondents and a review of the pleadings, I make the
following order:
1.

Petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel is denied;

2.

Petitioner's writ for habeas corpus is granted and he is

ordered

released

from the custody of the Utah

State Prison

forthwith.
3.

Respondent's motion to stay pending appeal is denied.
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As stated in the minute entry prepared and signed by this
court on November 2, 1992, this order is based on the following
stipulated facts:
1.

Petitioner was heard before the Board of Pardons by

appearing before Heather Cook on May 31, 1991. At that time, Ms.
Cook recommended that Mr. Preece be released on May 11, 1993. She
discussed with Mr. Preece that the time guidelines recommended 147
months (12 years, three months).

The recommendation of Ms. Cook

was then considered by the Board as a group and they determined not
to follow Ms. Cook's recommendation but ordered release for October
10, 1994.

That date was exactly 147 months, consistent with the

guidelines.
2.

Thereafter, it was learned that the Board's actual

guideline at that time was 111 months (9 years, three months)
rather than the 147 months they had thought. Under that guideline
the Petitioner would have been entitled to release October 10,
1991.
3.

Realizing that the Board of Pardons had not had the

opportunity to correct the error or explain their reasons for
deviating from the guidelines, the court continued the petition for
a writ several times. The Board held a "special attention" hearing
and without explanation of the error and explanation of the reason
or reasons to deviate from the guidelines they simply re-affirmed
the release date at 147 months for October 10, 1994.

2
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4.

This court finds that under the circumstance of the error

made as to the guidelines discussed with Petitioner that the
Petitioner is entitled to an explanation of the error which the
Board refuses to do.

Further, due process requires fair process

and a Petitioner is entitled to an explanation of why the error
should be ignored and the longer term served.

It is cruel and

unusual punishment to do otherwise. The Petitioner has been denied
due process and is being treated to cruel and unusual punishment
when no correction or explanation is given as to the mistake and as
to the time to be served by the Petitioner.
DATED this

«!?

day of November 1992.
BY THE COURT:
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JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
JAMES H. BEADLES (5250)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2525
Telephone: (801) 575-1600
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT D. PREECE,
Petitioner,
AFFIDAVIT OF
PATRICIA L. NEELEY
TOM HOUSE, Warden,
PETE HAUN, Chairman of the
Board of Pardons, HEATHER
COOK, Member of the Board of
Pardons, and other individual
members of the Board of Pardons
whose identities are
presently unknown,

Case No.

92065

Respondents.

STATE OF UTAH
ss,
SALT LAKE COUNTY
I, PATRICIA L. NEELEY, under oath state the following to be
true and correct to the best of my knowledge:
1.

I am a citizen and resident of the United States of

America and the State of Utah, and I am over the age of eighteen
(18) years.
2.

I am employed by the State of Utah as the Support Service

Specialist Supervisor for the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, and
I have custody of the Board's business records.
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3. The documents attached to this affidavit, labeled Exhibits
1 and 2, are true and correct copies of records kept in the Board's
file on Robert Douglas Preece, USP# 15903.
4.

The original documents are used in and maintained as part

of the Board's ordinary course of business activity and are
compiled at or near the time and place of the events contained
therein.

•tA

Dated this ^

day of "TO^X>^\vv^M , v / 1993.

PATRICIA L. NEELEY^-

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me this _^L day of
s» i*» M

fOo\)ewb^f

\

199.J.

^?» A m *m p»p» m

tloliry Pub!:^

JANET L LITTLE
Q
236 State Capitol
IZJ Salt Lake City, Utah 841 r
My Commission Expires
August 15,1995
State of Utah

I

S
B
J
I
I
!

FARY PUBMCi
esiding at
^ ^ A ^ C ^ ^ ^

My Commission Expires:
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\
Michael O. Leavltt
Governor
Michael R. Sibbett
Chairman

Members

w*z&

Donald E. Blanchard
H.L (Pete) Haun
Curtis L Garner
Cheryl Hansen

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In the case of Robert Douglas Preece, USP# 15903, the Board of Pardons issues the
following statement of clarification for its decision to grant a parole date of October 4 1 ,
1994.
Mr. Preece last appeared before the Board for a Special Attention Hearing on September 18,
1992. At that hearing his case was reviewed and he was given the opportunity to present
information for a reconsideration of his previously set parole date of October 11, 1994. A
decision was not made at that hearing and the case was taken under advisement for staffing
review with the Board. The staffing review was subsequently completed and on October 6,
1992, the decision of the Board was issued in writing, (see copy attached). A written
statement of the Board's rationale for this decision was also issued and copies of each
forwarded to Mr. Preece. (see copy attached).
The Board hereby reiterates the same rationale for its decision as provided to Mr. Preece in
writing on October 6, 1992.
1) The violent nature of the crimes for which Mr. Preece was convicted and is presently
incarcerated.
2) After Mr. Preece's conviction and commitment for two counts of Aggravated Robbery
and while still incarcerated, he was convicted of the new offense of Manslaughter;
3) The length of Mr. Preece's sentences, two five to life sentences for Aggravated Robbery
and a one to fifteen year sentence for Manslaughter (sentences are running concurrently).
4) The fact that Mr. Preece has only served ten years of incarceration on these sentences.
5) A serious disciplinary violation that occurred in July, 1991 involving the use of drugs. It
should be noted that this disciplinary incident occurred after the hearing at which the October,
1994 parole date was set. This is a serious violation which routinely results in the service of
additional time.
For these reasons, the Board of Pardons affirms the present parole date of October 11, 1994
is appropriate in this case. Mr. Preece has a lengthy juvenile record and when 18 years old
he was implicated and charged with eleven counts of Aggravated Robbery and subsequently
plea bargained to two counts.

Dated this A3

day of April, 1993.
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Law Library, J. Reuben E.
ClarkBlanchard,
Law School, BYU.
,£^#£^Donald
Vice
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Chairman

EXHIBIT 2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Name

^

N^*|>y

USP fl

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
•ATTHMATJ

The Board of Pardons' decision in this natter is based primarily, but not
exclusively, on the following reasons:
ASSBMAlffiS

A
(lft.H\t(J

ttUIfiolIHS
OTFWWR'S BACKGROUND
Criaiinal history significantly underepresented by guidelines
(i.e., stany sere thanftfelony convictions and/or 6 misdemeanors)
„« History of similar offenses
. Pattern of increasingly or decreaisingly serious offenses . . . .
tr
History of unsuccessful or successful supervisions
CIA1ACTKEIST1CB OF T O OFFBBK
Use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities
Demonstration of extreme cruelty or depravity
, Abuse of position of trust, special skill, or responsibility r\
reaped and/or
from thevictiiesWAA*
oiffenat
j £ L Actual
Multiplegain
incidents
Htb^^>y
b4-l<HX$J
Actual cain reacted
from the
offenafc
Jr XEE OFFENSE
' - . . ~. . *OFFENDER'S
HAITB
DOLING
_ ^ Motive (intentional, premeditated it. impuliive, reactionary) .
j£l Role (organiser, leader yi. follower, minimal participant) . •
Obetruction of justice yg. early withdrawal or eelf-surrender *. __
TICTIM CHARACTERISTICS
^
Extent of injury (physical,, emotional, financial, social)
^
Relatively vulnerable victim yg • aggressive or provoking victim
L^
Victim in position of authority over offender
OFniCKR'S PRESENT CHARACTERISTICS
Denial or mitigation Jtfie Complete acceptance of responsibility
\r
Extent of remorse and apparent motivation to rehabilitate • • •
Timeliness and extent of efforts to pay restitution . . . • * •
^
Prison or Parole programming (effort to enroll, etc%) « . • • .
LS*^
Prison disciplinary problems or other defiance of authority • .
Employment possibilities (history, skills» current job, future)
^
Extent of corwnunity support or community fear, condemnation . .
tr
Nature and stability of release plans
,
Overall rehabilitative progress and promise • • • .
•
Unusual institutional vulnerability (due to age, health, other)
Exceptional riak to aelf or others
•••«

JZ

OTHER
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UTAH SENTENCE AND RELEASE GUIDELINES

Appx. D
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